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2Abstract
The last two decades have seen a stream of innovation in financial markets, especially in
the corporate bond arena. Some of these innovations were designed to give firms more
flexibility in designing cash flows on borrowings, allowing them to match up cash flows
on financing more closely to cash flows on assets, thus increasing their debt capacity.
These changes have been for the most part good news for corporate treasurers, but the
relentless torrent of innovation has also resulted in some firms issuing these new and
more complex securities for the wrong reasons. Some have done so to keep up with other
firms in their peer group, and other to take advantage of loopholes in the way ratings
agencies and regulatory agencies define debt and equity.  In this context, it is worth
noting that as corporate bonds have become more complex, investment bankers once
more become indispensable to the process, proving both pricing and selling support. It is
important that firms recognize when complexity serves their interests, and when it can
end up hurting them.
3Firms, until the mid-seventies, had fairly simple choices when it came to
financing. They could raise equity by issuing common stock or debt by borrowing from a
bank or by issuing bonds. When borrowing, firms could choose between different
maturities and degrees to which the debt was secured by the assets of the firm (secured,
unsecured and subordinated debt). A few firms were daring enough to issue convertible
bonds.
The surge in inflation in the late seventies and the concurrent increase in the
volatility of interest rates created the first wave of innovation in debt securities, with
floating rate debt becoming a viable choice for most borrowers. Through the eighties, the
innovation continued. Some of the innovations, such as the introduction of ratings
sensitive bonds (where coupon rates vary with the company's bond rating), and equity-
linked bond issues (such as LYONs and TIGRs) were driven by the need to reassure bond
investors that they would be protected in the event the borrower attempted to expropriate
wealth from them. Others, such as mortgage-backed securities, were created to allow
firms to securitize assets which had hitherto been idle. Much of this innovation was
facilitated by a greater understanding of how to incorporate multiple options into
borrowing instruments, and how to price these complex securities.
In the course of these innovations, investment banks also discovered the allure of
coming up with new and more complex securities - they were much more profitable than
ta raditional straight bond with a fixed maturity and coupon. Thus, corporate finance
departments have continued through the nineties to offer their clients new and different
ways of raising financing. While there are a number of different motivations for these
innovations, some of these new securities share a common feature. Without being
4convertible into equity (like convertible bonds), they manage to still be hybrid securities-
they preserve the tax advantage associated with debt and have cash flows that make them
look more like equity securities. This paper is designed to explore the rationale for the
use of such securities and the potential dangers to firms from their overuse.
A Rationale for Debt/Equity Securities
To see why securities that play a dual role (of debt and equity) are appealing to
firms, consider the traditional choice between debt and equity. The trade off is simple.
Debt has a tax advantage, but it brings with it a greater risk of bankruptcy for the firm,
because the obligation to make fixed payments (interest and principal payments) remains
even when earnings drop. Thus, the optimal debt ratio is one where the net difference
between the tax benefits and the expected bankruptcy cost is maximized:
Value of Levered Firm = Value of Unlevered Firm + PV of Tax Benefits - PV of
Expected Bankruptcy Costs
Since bankruptcy costs are largely a result of the fact that the firm has to make
fixed payments even in periods when earnings are poor, consider borrowing money on a
security where interest payments are not fixed but vary as earnings vary. This reduces the
expected bankruptcy cost and increases both the optimal debt ratio for a firm and the total
firm value at that leverage.
To see why firms should match up cash flows on assets to cash flows on liabilities, let us
begin by defining firm value as the present value of the cash flows generated by the
assets owned by the firm. This firm value will vary over time, not only as a function of
firm-specific factors such as project success but also as a function of broader macro
economic variables - interest rates, inflation rates, economic cycles and exchange rates.
5Figure 1 provides the time series of firm value for a hypothetical firm, where all of the
changes in firm value are assumed to occur as a result of changes in macro economic
variables.
This firm can choose to finance these assets with any financing mix it wants. The value
of equity at any point in time is the difference between the value of the firm and the value
of outstanding debt. Assume, for instance, that the firm chooses to finance the assets
shown in Figure 1 using very short term debt, and that this debt is unaffected by changes
in macro economic variables. Figure 2 provides the firm value, debt value and equity
value over time for the firm.
Figure 1:  Firm Value over time 
Time (t)
Firm Value
Value of Debt
6Note that there are periods when the firm value drops below the debt value, which would
suggest that the firm is flirting with bankruptcy in those periods. Firms that weigh this
possibility into their financing decision will therefore borrow much less.
Now consider a firm which finances the assets described in Figure 1 with debt
that matches up exactly to the assets, in terms of cash flows, and also in terms of the
sensitivity of debt value to changes in macro economic variables. Figure 3 provides the
firm value, debt value and equity value for this firm.
Figure 2: Firm Value over time with Short Term Debtt
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7Since debt value and firm value move together here, the possibility of default is
significantly reduced. This, in turn, will allow the firm to carry much more debt, and the
added debt should provide tax benefits that make the firm more valuable. Thus, matching
liability cash flows to asset cash flows allows firms to have higher optimal debt ratios.
Examples of Securities
To examine how such securities would work, consider two innovations from the
last decade. The first is the commodity bond, where the coupon payments on the bond are
linked to the price of a specific commodity, such as gold or oil. For a gold mining
company, whose earnings are driven primarily by the price of gold, issuing commodity
bonds is an option that allows it to get the tax advantage associated with interest
payments, while reducing the risk of bankruptcy (that would have been associated with
issuing straight bonds) in the event of  a sharp drop in gold prices. The second is the
catastrophe bond, where coupon payments and principal payments (in some cases) can be
reduced or suspended in the event of a specified catastrophe (such as an earthquake or a
flood). For an insurance firm, which has significant exposure to liability claimes in a state
Figure 3: Firm Value over time with  Matched  Debtt
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Firm Value
Value of Equity
Value of Debt
8like California, this bond can provide a way of using debt without the concurrent risk of
bankruptcy that would accompany a major natural disaster.
As an example of a catastrophe bond issue, consider the bond issue made by
USAA Insurance Company. The company privately placed $ 477 million of these bonds,
backed up by reinsurance premiums, in June 1997. The company was protected in the
event of any hurricane that created more that $ 1 billion in damage to the East Coast
anytime before June 1998. The bonds came in two classes; in the first class, called
principal-at-risk, the company could reduce the principal on the bond in the event of a
hurricane; in the second class, which was less risky to investors, the coupon payments
would be suspended in the event of a hurricane, but the principal would be protected. In
return, the investors in these bonds, in October 1997, were earning an extra yield of
almost 1.5% on the principal-at-risk bonds and almost 0.5% on the principal-protected
bonds.
Where is the increase in value coming from?
It is important to note that the value added from these securities does not come
from fooling the bond buyers. They will clearly charge an appropriate premium over the
interest rate that they would have settled for on a straight bond. Thus, an insurance
company which issues catastrophe bonds will have to pay a higher interest rate than one
that issues a straight bond. If the firm had not issued these bonds, however, the expected
bankruptcy cost might have prevented them from ever borrowing. Even with a higher
interest rate, the catastrophe bonds may be less expensive than using equity.
The increase in value does not come from risk reduction, per se. As the
diversification argument goes, investors could have accomplished the same results using
9other traded securities (such as options or futures). Even in the case of risks that private
investors cannot easily trade on (such as the risk of a catastrophe), the argument can be
made that investors choose to expose themselves to this risk by buying stock in the
insurance firm. This diversification argument does not hold for private or closely held
firms, where the reduction in risk can lead to an increase in value.
The real source of the increase in value comes from the increase in debt capacity,
which allows firm to have a larger tax benefit with lower expected bankruptcy costs,
leading to a higher overall value for both the firm and its stockholders. It stands to reason,
then, that this value increment will not be garnered by firms which do not take advantage
of the cash flow matching on the debt to borrow more. For such firms, it can be argued
that the new securities will create little or no value.
The Derivative Alternative
Firms can create the equivalent of these debt/equity securities, by issuing straight
debt and using derivatives to make the net cash flows on the debt match up to the cash
flows on the assets. For instance, a gold mining company can issue long term straight
bonds and sell futures contracts on gold (or buy put options on gold) to create cash flows
similar to those in commodity bonds. As a general rule, firms should compare the long
term costs of using this approach to the costs associated with using bonds with these
features incorporated in them and choose the cheaper alternative. The use of straight
bonds in conjunctionwith derivatives can create larger costs in the long term but it does
provide for more flexibility where firms can vary the degree to which they match debt
cash flows and cash flows on assets from period to period.
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As a general rule, it seems reasonable to argue that firms which have long term,
stable exposure to specific risk should try to incorporate protection against this risk into
their financing. Firms which have short term and/or time-varying exposure to a specific
risk will be better off using derivatives to protect themselves against this risk.
Alternate and Less Compelling Reasons for the Use of
Debt/Equity Securities
In this paper, so far, we have established a good reason for the creation and
issuance of many of the complex securities that have been created in recent years. In this
section, we will look at other reasons for the issuance of these securities that are, in our
view, less compelling and could potentially get firms into trouble.
1. To Take Advantage of Ratings Agency and Regulatory Loopholes
There is an alternative rationale used by some firms for issuing securities that
look like debt on some dimensions and equity on others. Firms are rightfully concerned
about the views of equity research analysts and ratings agencies on the actions they take,
though they often overestimate the influence of both groups. Analysts represent
stockholders, and ratings agencies represent bond holders; consequently they take very
different views of the same actions. For instance, analysts may view a stock repurchase
by a company with limited project opportunities as a positive action, while ratings
agencies may view it as a negative action and lower ratings in response. Analysts and
ratings agencies also measure the impact of actions using very different criteria. In
general, analysts view a firm’s actions through the prism of higher earnings per share and
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by looking at the firm relative to comparable firms, using multiples such as PE or PBV
ratios. Ratings agencies, on the other hand, measure the effect of actions on the financial
ratios, such as debt ratios and coverage ratios, which they then use to assess default risk
and assign ratings.
Given the weight attached to the views of both these groups, firms sometimes
design securities with the intent of satisfying both groups. In some cases, they find ways
of raising funds that seem to make both groups happy, at least on the surface. Optimally,
firms would like to issue securities that look like cheap debt to equity research analysts
and safe equity to ratings agencies. To the degree that analysts and ratings agencies rely
on rigid definitions of debt and equity, firms can exploit limitations in these definitions to
present a security as debt to analysts and equity to ratings agencies.  As an example,
consider the use of trust preferred stock by some firms. These are securities where firms
make fixed payments that are tax deductible, making them debt in the views of many
equity research analysts. They generally have perpetual lives, and can lay claim to the
cash flows and assets of the firm only after other debt holders have been paid, making
them quasi-equity in the eyes of the ratings agencies.
Firms such as banks and insurance firms have a third group that they have to keep
happy - regulators. To the degree that regulatory constraints exist on the capital structure
of these firms, they look for ways to issue securities that preserve the tax advantages of
debt, while meeting the regulatory definition of equity. As an example, insurance
companies in the United States have issued surplus notes, which are considered debt for
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tax purposes and equity under insurance accounting rules, enabling them to have the best
of both worlds –– they could issue debt, while counting it as equity.1
There is clearly nothing untoward about a firm taking a financing issue that makes
sense from a fundamental standpoint, and then working with it to make it palatable and
even attractive to equity research analysts, ratings agencies and regulators. Thus a firm
which has excess debt capacity, which feels that it is being scrutinized closely by the
ratings agencies, can choose to issue trust preferred. The real danger is when firms issue
securities that cannot be justified on a fundamental basis, solely to take advantage of
loopholes in how ratings agencies or regulatory agencies define debt and equity. When
securities are designed in such a way, the real question is whether the markets are fooled
and if so, for how long. A over-levered firm that substitutes trust preferred for debt may
fool the ratings agency and even the debt markets for some period of time, but it cannot
evade the reality that it is much more levered and hence much riskier.
2.  To Be At the Forefront of Financial Innovation
There are some firms that feel straight bonds are passe, and that only stodgy
corporate finance departments would issue such securities. The reality, however, is that
there are some firms whose asset and cash flow structure is such that the right securities
for them might be long-term dollar-denominated straight bonds with no special features.
If such firms issue more complex securities, out of the misguided view that it reveals how
sophisticated they are, they incur unnecessary costs.  They may also end up with a
                                                
1 In 1994 and 1995, insurance companies issued a total of $ 6 billion of surplus notes in the private
placement market.
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mismatch on cash flows on debt and cash flows on assets that ends up lowering their
capacity to carry debt.
The simple rule in corporate finance is that firms should issue the securities that
are best suited to the assets that they are financing and should not be influenced by how
other firms around them, even in their peer group, are choosing to finance their needs.
The herd mentality is strong and tough to fight, but it should not be allowed to determine
financing choices.
3. To Fool Bond Buyers
While no firm (or investment banker advising it) would ever admit to such a
motive, the creation of more and more complex securities, with options piled on top and
other options, has clearly made bond valuation difficult to do for anyone without a
research department filled with doctorates in mathematics. To some issuers, the difficulty
that bond buyers face in pricing complex bonds provides an opportunity to issue these
bonds at prices above their true value.
This rationale has two major flaws. The first is that even if this can be done, firms
that do it lose valuable credibility with financial markets, and subsequent issues will be
greeted with skepticism by bond buyers. The second is that it is not a good idea to take
advantage of your own investors, whether they be stock or bond investors, since it is their
firm once they make the investment. The third is that investors are often much more
sophisticated than issuers give them credit for, and in many cases end up being right in
the long term.
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4. To Make Financial Intermediaries Indispensable
It is perhaps coincidence that the greatest wave of innovation has occurred in
bond markets, and that much of this innovation started occurring at the same time as
corporations were gaining more confidence in and control over the process of issuance.
The advent of shelf registration and the breakdown of relationship investment banking in
the late seventies put considerable pressure on the fees that investment banks were able to
charge on conventional straight bonds.
The more complex instruments that emerged from all of the financial innovation
of the last two decades have made investment bankers indispensable once again. First,
only the investment bankers have the "quant" power, with their well-stocked research
departments to actually price these securities. Second, the complexity of these securities
is such that they appeal to only certain sub-sets of investors; the investment banker is
familiar with these investors, knows how to reach them and has the salespeople to place
securities with them. Not surprisingly, these complex securities earn much larger
commissions for investment banks.
It is possible that I am just paranoid, and that investment bankers have only their
client's best interests at heart. It is also possible that they would not recommend these
more complex securities to firms when simpler securities may be all that is needed.
A General Framework for Designing Securities
In deciding on the optimal financing mix, firms should begin by examining the
characteristics of the assets that they own: Are they long term of short term? How
sensitive are they to economic conditions and inflation? What currencies are the cash
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flows in?. They should try to match up the maturity, interest rate and currency mix, and
special features on their financing to these characteristics. They can then superimpose a
series of considerations that may lead the firm to deviate from or modify this financing
mix. First, consider the tax savings that may accrue from using different financing
vehicles, and weigh the tax benefits against the costs of deviating from the mix. Next,
examine the influence that equity research analysts and ratings agency views have on the
choice of financing vehicle; instruments that are looked on favorably by either or, better
still, both groups will clearly be preferred to those that evoke strong negative responses
from them. Finally, factor in the difficulty that you might have in conveying information
to markets; in the presence of asymmetric information, firms may have to make financing
choices that do not reflect their asset mix. Finally, allow for the possibility that you may
want to structure their financing to reduce agency conflicts between stockholders and
bondholders.  These steps are summarized in Figure 4.
Conclusion
The innovations in corporate bonds that have occurred in the last two decades
have been caused by a number of factors. The increase in volatility in interest rates that
accompanied higher inflation in the late seventies and the globalization of U.S. firms (and
the consequent exposure to exchange rate risk) played a role. Firms also recognized that
adding options to debt, whether these options were on commodity prices, currency rates
or related to the occurrence of specific events, could reduce their exposure to bankruptcy
risk and increase their capacity to borrow more. Thus, securities have become more
complex over time.
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It is also worth noting, however, that some firms have issued more complex
securities for the wrong reasons - to be like other firms that might have issued similar
securities, to take advantage of loopholes in the way ratings agencies and regulatory
agencies define debt and equity and fool bond buyers. Investment banks which generate
larger fees on complex securities clearly have their own incentives to get firms to use
these securities.
As in all commercial transactions, firms should look out for their own interests.
They should recognize that issuing these innovative securities which are unsuited to their
needs not only exposes them to unnecessary expenses, but may actually increase their
risk of bankruptcy and reduce debt capacity. Fooling ratings agencies, regulatory
authorities and bond buyers is a short-term tactic that will boomerang on firms in the long
term.
